Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations of priced timed automata between two players-Player Min and Player Max-by moving a token along the states of the graph to form an infinite run. The goal of Player Min is to minimize the limit average weight of the run, while the goal of the Player Max is the opposite. Brenguier, Cassez, and Raskin recently studied a variation of these games and showed that mean-payoff games are undecidable for timed automata with five or more clocks. We refine this result by proving the undecidability of mean-payoff games with three clocks. On a positive side, we show the decidability of mean-payoff games on one-clock timed automata with binary price-rates. A key contribution of this paper is the application of dynamic programming based proof techniques applied in the context of average reward optimization on an uncountable state and action space.
Introduction
The classical mean-payoff games [24, 13, 15, 4] are two-player zero-sum games that are played on weighted finite graphs, where two players-Max and Min-take turn to move a token along the edges of the graph to jointly construct an infinite play. The objectives of the players Max and Min are to respectively maximize and minimize the limit average reward associated with the play. Mean-payoff games are well-studied in the context of optimal controller synthesis in the framework of Ramadge-Wonham [22] , where the goal of the game is to find a control strategy that maximises the average reward earned during the evolution of the system. Mean-payoff games enjoy a special status in verification, since µ-calculus model checking and parity games can be reduced in polynomial-time to solving mean-payoff games. Mean-payoff objectives can also be considered as quantitative extensions [16] of classical Büchi objectives, where we are interested in the limit-average share of occurrences of accepting states rather than merely in whether or not infinitely many accepting states occur. For a broader discussion on quantitative verification, in general, and the transition from the classical qualitative to the modern quantitative interpretation of deterministic Büchi automata, we refer the reader to Henzinger's excellent survey [16] . We study mean-payoff games played on an infinite configuration graph of timed automata. Asarin and Maler [3] were the first to study games on timed automata and they gave an algorithm to solve timed games with reachability time objective. Their work was later generalized and improved upon by Alur et al. [1] and Bouyer et al. [8] . Bouyer et al. [7, 5] also studied the more difficult average payoffs, but only in the context of scheduling, which in game-theoretic terminology corresponds to 1-player games. However, they left the problem of proving decidability of 2-player average reward games on priced timed automata open. Jurdziński and Trivedi [19] proved the decidability of the special case of average time games XX:2
Mean-Payoff Games on Timed Automata
where all locations have unit costs. More recently, mean-payoff games on timed automata have been studied by Brenguier, Cassez and Raskin [10] where they consider average payoff per time-unit. Using the undecidability of energy games [9] , they showed undecidability of mean-payoff games on weighted timed games with five or more clocks. They also gave a semi-algorithm to solve cycle-forming games on timed automata and characterized the conditions under which a solution of these games gives a solution for mean-payoff games.
On the positive side, we characterize general conditions under which dynamic programming based techniques can be used to solve the mean-payoff games on timed automata. As a proof-of-concept, we consider one-clock binary-priced timed games, and prove the decidability of mean-payoff games for this subclass. Our decidability result can be considered as the average-payoff analog of the decidability result by Brihaye et al. [11] for reachability-price games on timed automata. We strengthen the known undecidability results for mean-payoff games on timed automata in three ways: i) we show that the mean-payoff games over priced timed games is undecidable for timed games with only three clocks; ii) secondly, we show that undecidability can be achieved with binary price-rates; and finally, iii) our undecidability results are applicable for problems where the average payoff is considered per move as well as for problems when it is defined per time-unit.
Howard [17, 21] introduced gain and bias optimality equations to characterize optimal average on one-player finite game arenas. Gain and bias optimality equations based characterization has been extended to two-player game arenas [14] as well as many subclasses of uncountable state and action spaces [12, 6] . The work of Bouyer et al. [6] is perhaps the closest to our approach-they extended optimality equations approach to solve games on hybrid automata with certain strong reset assumption that requires all continuous variables to be reset at each transition, which in the case of timed automata is akin to requiring all clocks to be reset at each transition. To the best of our knowledge, the exact decidability for timed games does not immediately follow from any previously known results.
Howard's Optimality equations requires two variable per state: the gain of the state and the bias of the state. Informally speaking, the gain of a state corresponds to the optimal mean-payoff for games starting from that state, while the bias corresponds to the limit of transient sum of step-wise deviations from the optimal average. Hence, intuitively at a given point in a game, both players would prefer to first optimize the gain, and then choose to optimize bias among choices with equal gains. We give general conditions under which a solution of gain-bias equations for a finitary abstraction of timed games can provide a solution of gain-bias equations for the original timed game. For this purpose, we exploit a region-graph like abstraction of timed automata [18] called the boundary region abstraction (BRA). Our key contribution is the theorem that states that every solution of gain-bias optimality equations for boundary region abstraction carries over to the original timed game, as long as for every region, the gain values are constant and the bias values are affine.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2 we describe mean-payoff games and introduce the notions of gain and bias optimality equations. This section also introduces mean-payoff games over timed automata and states the key results of the paper. Section 3 introduces the boundary region abstraction for timed automata and characterizes the conditions under which the solution of a game played over the boundary region abstraction can be lifted to a solution of mean payoff game over priced timed automata. In Section 4 we present the strategy improvement algorithm to solve optimality equations for mean-payoff games played over boundary region abstraction and connect them to solution of optimality equations over corresponding timed automata. Finally, Section 5 sketches the undecidability of mean-payoff games for binary-priced timed automata with three clocks.
Mean-Payoff Games Definition 1 (Turn-Based Game Arena). A game arena Γ is a tuple (S, S Min , S Max , A, T, π)
where S is a (potentially uncountable) set of states partitioned between sets S Min and S Max of states controlled by Player Min and Player Max, respectively; A is a (potentially uncountable) set of actions; T : S × A → S is a partial function called transition function; and π : S × A → R is a partial function called price function.
We say that a game arena is finite if both S and A are finite. For any state s ∈ S, we let A(s) denote the set of actions available in s, i.e., the actions a ∈ A for which T (s, a) and π(s, a) are defined. A transition of a game arena is a tuple (s, a, s ) ∈ S×A×S such that s = T (s, a) and we write s a − → s . A finite play starting at a state s 0 is a sequence of transitions s 0 , a 1 , s 1 , a 2 , . . . , s n ∈ S×(A×S)
* such that for all 0 i < n we have that this number and we call it the value of the mean-payoff game at state s. We say that a game is positionally-determined if for every ε > 0 we have strategies µ ε ∈ Π Min and χ ε ∈ Π Max such that for every initial state s ∈ S, we have that
For a given ε we call each such strategy an ε-optimal strategy for the respective player. Given two functions G : S → R (gain) and B : S → R (bias), we say that (G, B) is a solution to the optimality equations for mean-payoff game on Γ = (S,
We prove the following theorem connecting a solution of the optimality equations with meanpayoff games. We exploit this theorem to solve mean-payoff games on timed automata. Proof. Assume that we are given the functions G : S → R with finite image and B : S → R with bounded image such that (G, B) |= Opt(Γ). In order to prove the result we show, for every ε > 0, the existence of positional strategies µ ε and χ ε such that
The proof is in two parts. Given ε > 0 we compute the positional strategy µ ε ∈ Π Min satisfying the following conditions: 
. . is a non-increasing sequence. Since G is finite image, the sequence eventually becomes constant. Assume that for i N we have that G(s i ) = g. Now notice that for all i N we have that
Hence g lim sup
This part is analogous to the first part of the proof and is omitted. The proof is now complete.
Timed Automata
Priced Timed Game Arenas (PTGAs) extend classical timed automata [2] with a partition of the actions between two players Min and Max. Before we present the syntax and semantics of PTGAs, we need to introduce the concept of clock variables and related notions. Clocks. Let X be a finite set of clocks. A clock valuation on X is a function ν : X →R 0 and we write V (X ) (or just V when X is clear from the context) for the set of clock valuations. Abusing notation, we also treat a valuation ν as a point in (R 0 ) |X | . Let 0 denote the clock valuation that assigns 0 to all clocks. If ν ∈ V and t ∈ R 0 then we write ν+t for the clock valuation defined by (ν+t)(c) = ν(c)+t for all c ∈ X . For C ⊆ X , we write ν C for the valuation where ν C (c) equals 0 if c ∈ C and ν(c) otherwise. For X ⊆ V (X ), we write X for the smallest closed set in V containing X. Although clocks are usually allowed to take arbitrary non-negative values, for notational convenience we assume that there is a K ∈ N such that for every c ∈ X we have ν(c) K. Clock Constraints. A clock constraint over X with upper bound K ∈ N is a conjunction of simple constraints of the form c i or c−c i, where c, c ∈ X , i ∈ N, i K, and ∈ {<, >, =, , }. For ν ∈ V (X ) and K ∈ N, let CC(ν, K) be the set of clock constraints with upper bound K which hold in ν, i.e. those constraints that resolve to true after substituting each occurrence of a clock x with ν(x). Regions and Zones. Every clock region is an equivalence class of the indistinguishabilityby-clock-constraints relation. For a given set of clocks X and upper bound K ∈ N on clock constraints, a clock region is a maximal set ζ⊆V (X ) such that CC(ν, K)=CC(ν , K) for all ν, ν ∈ ζ. For the set of clocks X and upper bound K we write R(X , K) for the corresponding finite set of clock regions. We write [ν] for the clock region of ν. A clock zone is a convex set of clock valuations that satisfies constraints of the form γ :: 1 , c 2 ∈ X and ∈ {≤, <, =, >, ≥}. We write Z(X , K) for the set of clock zones over the set of clocks X and upper bound K. When X and K are clear from the context we write R and Z for the set of regions and zones. In this paper we fix a positive integer K, and work with K-bounded clocks and clock constraints.
Priced Timed Game Arena: Syntax and Semantics
where L Min and L Max are sets of locations controlled by Player Min and Player Max and we write L = L Min ∪ L Max ; Act is a finite set of actions; X is a finite set of clocks; Inv : L → Z is an invariant condition; E : L×Act → Z is an action enabledness function;
When we consider a PTGA as an input of an algorithm, its size is understood as the sum of the sizes of encodings of L, X , Inv, Act, E, ρ, δ and p. We draw the states of Min players as circles, while states of Max player as boxes.
, where is a location and ν a clock valuation such that ν ∈ Inv( ). For any t ∈ R 0 , we let ( , ν)+t equal the configuration ( , ν+t). In a configuration ( , ν), a timed action (time-action pair) (t, a) is available if and only if the invariant condition Inv( ) is continuously satisfied while t time units elapse, and a is enabled (i.e. the enabling condition E( , a) is satisfied) after t time units have elapsed. Furthermore, if the timed action (t, a) is performed, then the next configuration is determined by the transition relation δ and the reset function ρ, i.e. the clocks in ρ(a) are reset and we move to the location δ( , a).
A game on a PTGA starts in an initial configuration ( , ν) ∈ L × V and players Min and Max construct an infinite play by taking turns to choose available timed actions (t, a) whenever the current location is controlled by them and the price p( ) · t + p( , a) is paid to the Max by player Min. Formally, PTGA semantics is given as a game arena. 
Definition 4 (PTGA Semantics
We are interested in the mean-payoff decision problem for timed automata T that asks to decide whether the value of the mean-payoff game for a given state is below a given budget. For a PTGA T and budget r ∈ R, we write MPG(T, r) for the r-mean payoff decision problem that asks whether value of the game at the state ( , 0) is smaller than r. The following theorem summarizes the key contribution of this paper.
Theorem 5.
The decision problem MPG(T, r) for binary-priced timed automata T is undecidable for automata with three clocks, and decidable for automata with one clock.
Boundary Region Graph Abstraction
In this section we introduce an abstraction of priced timed games called the boundary region abstraction (that generalizes classical corner-point abstraction [7] ), and characterize conditions under which a solution of optimality equations for the boundary region abstraction can be lifted to a solution of optimality equations for timed automata. Observe that in order to keep our result as general as possible, we present the abstraction and corresponding results for timed automata with an arbitrary number of clocks. In the following section, we show that the required conditions hold for the case of one-clock binary-priced timed automata. Timed Successor Regions. Recall that R is the set of clock regions. For ζ, ζ ∈ R, we say that ζ is in the future of ζ, denoted ζ * − → ζ , if there exist ν ∈ ζ, ν ∈ ζ and t ∈ R 0 such that ν = ν+t and say ζ is the time successor of ζ if ν+t ∈ ζ ∪ ζ for all t t and write ζ → ζ , or equivalently ζ ← ζ, to denote this fact. For regions ζ, ζ ∈ R such that ζ * − → ζ we write If ζ ∈ R Thick , then there are infinitely many t ∈ R 0 such that ν+t ∈ ζ . However, amongst all such t's, for one of the boundaries of ζ , the closer ν+t is to this boundary, the 'better' the timed action (t, a) becomes for a player's objective. However, since ζ is a thick region, the set {t ∈ R 0 | ν+t ∈ ζ } is an open interval, and hence does not contain its boundary values. Let the closest boundary of ζ from ν be defined by the hyperplane c = b inf and the farthest boundary of ζ from ν be defined by the hyperplane c = b sup .
is the infimum (supremum) of the time spent to reach the lower (upper) boundary of region ζ . Let the zones that correspond to these boundaries be denoted by ζ inf and ζ sup respectively. Then ζ → b inf ,c ζ inf → ζ and ζ → bsup,c ζ sup ← ζ . In the boundary region abstraction we include these 'best' timed actions through (b inf , c, a, ζ ) and (b sup , c, a, ζ ). If ζ ∈ R Thin , then there exists a unique t ∈ R 0 such that ν+t ∈ ζ . Moreover since ζ is a thin region, there exists a clock c ∈ C and a number b ∈ N such that ζ → b,c ζ and
In the boundary region abstraction we summarise this 'best' timed action from region ζ via region ζ through the action (b, c, a, ζ ). Based on this intuition above the boundary region abstraction (BRA) is defined as follows.
Definition 6. For a priced timed game arena
S ⊆ L×V ×R is the set of states such that ( , ν, ζ) ∈ S if and only if ζ ⊆ Inv( ) and ν ∈ ζ (recall that ζ denotes the closure of ζ);
) and one of the following conditions holds:
Although the boundary region abstraction is not a finite game arena, every state has only finitely many time-successor (the boundaries of the regions) and for a fixed initial state we can restrict attention to a finite game arena due to the following observation.
Lemma 7 ( [23].). Let T be a priced timed game arena and T the corresponding BRA. For any state of T, its reachable sub-graph is finite and can be constructed in time exponential in the size of T when T has more than one clock. For one clock T, the reachable sub-graph of T can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of T. Moreover, the reachable sub-graph from the initial location and clock valuation is precisely the corner-point abstraction.

Reduction to Boundary Region Abstraction
In what follows, unless specified otherwise, we fix a
In this section we show under what conditions we can lift a solution (G, B) of optimality equations of BRA to (G , B ) for priced timed game arena. Given a set of valuations X⊆V , a function f : X → R 0 is affine if for any valuations ν x , ν y ∈ X we have that for all
We say that a function f : S → R 0 is regionally affine if f ( , ·, ζ) is affine over a region for all ∈ L and ζ ∈ R, and f is regionally constant if f ( , ·, ζ) is constant over a region for all ∈ L and ζ ∈ R. Some properties of affine functions that are useful in the proof of the key lemma are given in Lemma 8.
is also an affine function, and
Theorem 9. Let G : S → R and B : S → R are such that (G, B) |= Opt( T) and G is regionally constant and B is regionally affine, then (G , B ) |= Opt(T).
Proof. We need to show that (G , B ) |= Opt(T), i.e. for every
Consider the case when s = ( , ν) ∈ S Min and consider the right side of the gain equations.
The first equality holds since (G, B) |= Opt( T). The second equality follows since G is regionally constant and hence it suffices to consider the delay time(ν, (b, c)) that corresponds to either left or right boundary of the region ζ , i.e. for fixed ν, ζ and a ∈ Act we have that inf t :
Similarly, for the bias equations, we need to show:
=0] = ζ with ζ → bα,cα ζ if ζ is thin; and ζ → bα,cα ζ inf → ζ for some ζ inf ∈ R or ζ → bα,cα ζ sup → ζ for some ζ sup ∈ R if ζ is thick. Given B is regionally affine (and hence linear in t) and the price function is linear in t, the whole
is linear in t and from Lemma 8 it attains its infimum or supremum on either boundary of the region.
4
Decidability for One Clock Binary-priced PTGA Given the undecidability with 3 or more clocks, we focus on one clock PTGA. We provide a strategy improvement algorithm to compute a solution G : S → R and B : S → R of the optimality equations, i.e. (G, B) |= Opt( T) for the BRA T = ( S, S Min , S Max , A, T , π) of one-clock binary-priced PTGAs with certain "integral payoff" restriction. Further, we show that for one clock binary-priced integral-payoff PTGA, the solution of optimality equations of corresponding BRG is such that the gains are regionally constant and biases are regionally affine. Hence by Theorem 9, the algorithm can be applied to solve mean-payoff games for one-clock binary-priced integral-payoff PTGAs. We also show how to lift the integral-payoff restriction to recover decidability for one-clock binary-priced PTGA.
Regionally constant positional strategies. Standard strategy improvement algorithms iterate over a finite set of strategies such that the value of the subgame at each iteration gets strictly improved. However, since there are infinitely many positional strategies in a boundary region abstraction, we focus on "regionally constant" positional strategies (RCPSs). We say that a positional strategy µ :
We similarly define RCPSs for player Max. In other words, in an RCPS a player chooses same boundary action for every valuation of a region-as a side-result we show that optimal strategies for both players have this form. Observe that there are finitely many RCPSs for both players. We write Π Min and Π Max for the set of RCPSs for player Min and player Max, respectively. For a BRA T, χ ∈ Π Max , and µ ∈ Π Min we write T(χ) and T(µ) for the "one-player" game on the sub-graph of BRAs where the strategies of player Max and Min have been fixed to RCPSs χ and µ, respectively. Similarly we define the zero-player game T(µ, χ) where strategies of both players are fixed to RCPSs µ and χ.
Let T(χ, µ) be a zero-player game on the subgraph where strategies of player Max (and Min) is fixed to RCPSs χ (and µ). Observe that for T(µ, χ) the unique runs originating from statesŝ 0 = ( , ν, ζ) andŝ 0 = ( , ν , ζ) with [ν] = [ν ] follow the same "lasso" after one step, i.e. the unique runsŝ 0
. This is so because for oneclock timed automata the successors of the statesŝ 0 = ( , ν, ζ) andŝ 0 = ( , ν , ζ) for action
if c ∈ ρ(a) and ν (c) = 0 otherwise. Consider the optimality equations (Section C.3) for the lasso. Observe that the gain for the statesŝ 0 , . . . ,ŝ k+N −1 is the same, and let's call it g. If we add the bias equations side-wise for the cycle, we get g =
It follows from the previous observation that the gains are regionally constant.
Integral Payoff PTGA. The gain in a zero-player game, T(χ, µ), although regionallyconstant, may not be a whole number. We say that a PTGA is integral-payoff if for every pair (µ, χ) ∈ Π Min × Π Max of RCPSs the gain as defined above is a whole number. Observe that the denominator in the gains correspond to the number of edges in a simple cycle of the BRA T. If there are N simple cycles in the region graph of length n 1 , n 2 . . . , n N , then let L be the least-common multiple of n 1 , n 2 . . . , n N . We multiply constants appearing in the guards and invariants of the timed automata by L. It is easy to observe that mean-payoff of any state in the original PTGA T is the mean-payoff in Υ T divided by L. For notational convenience, we assume that the given PTGA is an integral-payoff PTGA and hence for RCPS strategy profile (µ, χ) the gain is regionally constant and integral.
Let Reach(C) be set of vertices that reach C; Let γ be the average weight of the cycle (w is constant on cycles);
Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Binary-Priced PTGA
Let T be a one-clock integral-payoff binary-priced PTGA T and T be its boundary region graph. For a given RCPS profile (µ, χ) ∈ Π Min × Π Max , Algorithm 1 computes the solution for the optimality equations Opt (T(µ, χ) ). This algorithm considers T(µ, χ) as a graph whose vertices are "regions" ( , [ν], ζ) corresponding to state ( , ν, ζ) ∈ S of the boundary region graph, edges are boundary actions between them determined by the regionally constant strategy profile, and weight of an edge is the time function associated with the boundary action. Observe that every cycle in this graph will have constant weight on the edges since taking boundary actions in a loop will require going from an integral valuation to another integral valuation, and the average cost of such a cycle can be easily computed.
Also observe that, not unlike standard convention [21] , our algorithm chooses a vertex in a cycle arbitrarily and fixes the bias of all of the states in that vertex to 0. This is possible since optimality equations over a cycle are underdetermined, and we exploit this flexibility to achieve solution to biases in a particularly "simple" structure. We say that a function f : S → R 0 is regionally simple [3] if for all ∈ L, ζ, ζ ∈ R either i) there exists
Key properties of regionally simple functions (Lemma 20 in Appendix C.2) include that they are also regionally affine, closed under minimum and maximum, and if B : S → R be a regionally simple function and G :ŝ → N be a regionally constant function, thenŝ → π(ŝ, α) − G(ŝ) + B(ŝ ) whereŝ α − →ŝ is a regionally simple function. Using these properties and induction on the distance to -minimal element in the reachable cycle, we prove the correctness and following property of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 10. Algorithm 1 computes solution of optimality equations (G, B) |= Opt( T(µ, χ))
for µ ∈ Π Min and χ ∈ Π Max . Moreover, G is regionally constant and B is regionally simple.
The strategy improvement algorithm to solve optimality equations is given as Algorithm 2. It begins by choosing an arbitrary regionally constant positional strategy χ and at every iteration of the loop (2-11) the algorithm computes (5-9) the value (G, B) of the current RCPS χ and based on the value, the function ImproveMaxStrategy returns an improved strategy by picking boundary action that lexicographically maximizes gain and bias respect- ing the policy that switches a decision only for a strict improvement. We formally define the function ImproveMaxStrategy as follows: for χ∈ Σ Max , G : S→R, and B : S→R we let strategy ImproveMaxStrategy(T, χ, G, B) be such that for allŝ ∈ S Max we have
where
− →ŝ } and Choose picks an arbitrary element from a set. ImproveMaxStrategy satisfies the following. It follows from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 that at every iteration of the strategy improvement the strategies µ and χ are RCPSs. Together with finiteness of the set of RCPSs and strict improvement at every step (Lemma 21 and 22), we get following result.
Theorem 13. Algorithm 2 computes solution of optimality equations (G, B) |= Opt( T) for integral payoff PTGA T. Moreover, G is regionally constant and B is regionally affine.
This theorem-together with Theorem 9 and Theorem 2-gives a proof of decidability for mean-payoff games for integral-payoff binary-priced one-clock timed automata.
5
Undecidability Results Theorem 14. The mean-payoff problem MPG(T, r) is undecidable for PTGA T with 3 clocks having location-wise price-rates π( ) ∈ {0, 1, −1} for all ∈ L and r = 0. Moreover, it is undecidable for binary-priced T with 3 clocks and r >= 0.
1 Figure 1 Simulation to decrement counter C1, mean cost is ε for error ε. The widget WD 1 2 has exactly the same structure and guards on all transitions as WD Proof. We first show the undecidability result of the mean-payoff problem MPG(T, 0) with location prices {1, 0, −1} and no edge prices. We prove the result by reducing the nonhalting problem of 2 counter machines. Our reduction uses a PTGA with 3 clocks x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , location prices {1, 0, −1}, and no edge prices. Each counter machine instruction (increment, decrement, zero check) is specified using a PTGA module. The main invariant in our reduction is that on entry into any module, we have Figure 1 . For conciseness, we present here modules using arbitrary location prices. However, we can redraw these with extra locations and edges using only the location prices from {1, 0, −1} as shown for W D 1 1 in Figure 5 in Appendix. The role of the Min player is to faithfully simulate the two counter machine, by choosing appropriate delays to adjust the clocks to reflect changes in counter values. Player Max will have the opportunity to verify that player Min did not cheat while simulating the machine.
We enter location k with x 1 = , the cost of going once from location A to E is 5ε. Also, when we get back to A after going through the loop once, the clock values with which we entered WD 1 1 are restored; thus, each time, we come back to A, we restore the starting values with which we enter WD 1 1 . The third clock is really useful for this purpose only. It can be seen that the mean cost of transiting from A to A through E is ε. In a similar way, it can be checked that the mean cost of transiting from A to A through E in widget WD 1 2 is ε when player Min chooses a delay 4x old − ε at k . Thus, if player Min makes a simulation error, player Max can always choose to goto one of the widgets, and ensure that the mean pay-off is not 0. Note that when ε = 0, then player Min will achieve his objective: the mean pay-off will be 0. Details of other gadgets are in Appendix D.1.
In the Appendix D.2, we show how this undecidability results extends (with the same parameters) if one defines mean payoff per time unit instead of per step. This way of averaging across time spent was considered in [10] , where the authors show the undecidability of MPG(T, 0) with 5 clocks. We improve this result to show undecidability already in 3 clocks.
Appendix
A Supplementary material to Section 2
A.1 Strategy improvement algorithm for Finite Game Arenas
Let Γ be a finite game arena. For technical convenience let us fix an arbitrary but fixed linear order ⊆ S 2 on the set of states S. For a positional strategy χ ∈ Π Max we write Γ χ for the subgame of Γ where the outgoing transitions from the states controlled by Player Max have been restricted to the ones allowed by χ. We similarly define Γ µ and Γχµ. Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Finite Game Arenas. The strategy improvement algorithm to compute s solution of optimality equations works as follows. 
1.
Fix an arbitrary positional strategy χ : S Max → A for player Max. 2. (Best counter-strategy against χ.) Compute the best counter-strategy µ for player Min against the strategy χ by performing
and hence G(s) = G(s )), and B(s) = (π(s, a) − G(s)) + B(s ).
Observe that the functions G and B thus obtained satisfy the optimality equations for the subgame Γ χ . However, these function may not satisfy the optimality equations for the original game Γ. The next step "locally" changes the strategy χ, intuitively in order to make progress towards computing the optimality equations. 
(Local
values (G(s ), B(s )) as the state χ(s). This assumption is important for finite termination of the strategy improvement algorithm.
4.
If the local improvement of the strategy χ in the previous step resulted in a change of χ in at least one state then go back to step 2. Otherwise stop. We establish the following two fundamental properties of the iterative scheme of strategy improvement described above. The first observation that a locally optimal strategy yields a solution to optimality equations is straightfoward to check.
Lemma 15 (OE Solution from a locally optimal strategy). If the algorithm stops then the tuple (G, B) computed in the last iteration is a solution to optimality equations.
Next, we show that in every non-terminating iteration of the algorithm, the pair (G, B) consisting of the gain function G and the bias function B, that are uniquely determined from the current pair of strategies χ and µ, strictly increases according to a certain linear ordering as a result of the local improvement. This implies finite termination of the algorithm, since there are only finitely many positional strategies. Thus, together with Lemma 15, we get the existence of an OE Solution, which establishes positional determinacy of mean-payoff games on finite game arenas.
Theorem 16 (Strict global improvement from myopic improvement). Let µ (µ ) be the best counter-strategy for player Min against a strategy χ (χ ) for player Max, and let G (G ) and B (B ) be as computed in step 2 of an iteration of the algorithm starting from the strategy χ (χ .) If the strategy χ is a non-trivial local improvement of the strategy χ, as computed in step 3 of the algorithm, then for every state s ∈ S, the following hold.
We have G (s) G(s).
If G (s) = G(s) then B (s) B(s).
If s∈S Max and χ (s) =χ(s) then either G (s)>G(s), or G (s)=G(s) and B (s)>B(s).
Proof. In order to verify property 1 it suffices to show that the average weight of every cycle reachable from a state s in the strategy subgraph Γ χ is no smaller than the smallest average weight of a cycle reachable from the state s in the strategy subgraph Γ χ . First, observe that for every transition (s, a, s ) in the subgraph of the graph Γ χ , we have the inequality
G(s) G(s ). It implies in Γ χ we have that G(s) is smaller than average of the cheapest reachable cycle. On the other hand G (s) is the average of the cheapest cycle in Γ χ . It follows that G(s) G(s ).
Now we argue that the properties 2 and 3 hold. From the assumption that G (s) = G(s) it follows that the paths from the state s in graphs Γχµ and Γ χ µ lead to the same cycle. 
We need to prove that B (s) B(s) and that χ (s) = χ(s) implies B (s) > B(s).
First, observe that for every transition (s, a, s ) in the subgraph of the graph Γ χ induced by the set of states W s , we have the inequality B(s) (π(s, a) − G(s)) + B(s
i ) (π(s i , a i+1 ) − G(s i )) + B(s i+1 ), for i = 0, 1, . . . , p − 1, we get that B(s) p−1 i=0 (π(s i , a i+1 ) − G
(s)). This, however, implies that B(s)
B (s), since if the previous inequality holds for all the paths from s to m s in the appropriate subgraph of Γ χ , then it also holds for the shortest such. This establishes property 2. Property 3 now follows from the strictness of the inequality B(s 0 ) < (π(s 0 , a 1 ) − G(s 0 )) + B(s 1 ) if we assume that χ (s) = χ(s). Note that this is when the assumption at the end of step 3 is necessary to avoid looping without strict improvement of neither the gain nor the bias function from one iteration of the algorithm to another.
B Boundary Region Abstraction: Illustration
A PTGA is shown at the top of Figure 2 . A sub-graph of BRA reachable from ( 0 , (0.3, 0.1), 0<y<x<1) is shown below the PTGA in the same figure. The names of the regions correspond to the regions depicted in the bottom right corner. Edges are labelled (a, c, b, ζ) and the intuitive meaning is to wait until clock c reaches the value b in the boundary of the region ζ. Considering the region ζ 1 , we see that it is determined by the constraints (1<x<2)∧(0<y<1)∧(y<x−1). The bold numbers on edges correspond to the time delay be- fore the action labelling the edge is taken. Figure 2 includes the actions available in the initial state and one of the action pairs that are available in the state ( 1 , (0, 1), (x=0)∧(1<y<2)).
C Proofs from Section 4 C.1 Examples of PTGAs with non-affine Bias Functions
Example 17. Consider the timed game shown in Figure 3 . All the locations here belong to the player Min. There are two cycles in which the gains or the average weight of the cycles is . the following sequence of moves by both players. From the initial state ( 1 , x = 0), player Min waits at 1 for 0.5 time units and then moves the token to location 2 . player Max moves the token to 4 immediately and subsequently the token reaches 1 with the value of clock x = 1 − δ, where δ is an infintesimal positive quantity. The token is forwarded to 2 now instantaneously or after an infintesimal delay so that the value of clock x is still less than 1. player Max now forwards the token to 3 when the value of clock x becomes 1. At location 3 , 1 − δ amount of time is elapsed. In the next move of player Max, the token reaches the initial state ( 1 , x = 0). The ε-optimal strategies of both Min and player Max are not regionally constant boundary strategies.
{π(s, (t, a))−G(s)+B(s ) : s (t,a)
− −− → s and G(s) = G(s )} if s ∈ S
Lemma 19. In one clock binary non-integral payoff PTGA the bias may not be regionally affine. The same is true for for the BRA of the PTGA.
Proof. Consider the example in Figure 3 . There are two loops, one consisting of locations 2 and 3 and the other one with locations 4 and 5 . For the states ( 2 , ν) and ( 3 , ν) where ν is any valuation of clock x, the gain g equals 2 . Hence the corresponding PTGA is a non-integral payoff one. Note that all the states in the non-integral payoff PTGA in Figure 3 belong to the player Min. Since the gains corresponding to both the loops are the same, the optimal strategy of the player Min from a state ( 1 , ν) is determined by the bias of a successor state.
We now show that the bias of a state ( 1 , ν) may not be regionally affine. For computing the bias in the loop consisting of the locations 2 and 3 , let us consider that B( 2 , ν) = 0. Thus considering the successor state of a state ( 1 , ν) to be the state ( 2 , ν + t), we have
In the loop consisting of locations 4 and 5 , let B( 5 , ν) = 0. Now
Thus considering the successor state of a state ( 1 , ν) to be the state ( 4 , ν + t), we have
Hence the bias at ( 1 , ν) is given by min( 
C.2 Regionally Simple Functions: Properties
Simple functions were introduced by Asarin and Maler [3] in the context of reachability timed games for timed automata.
Lemma 20 (Simple Functions and Their Properties
The simple functions have the following properties. 
Every simple function is an affine function.
Every regionally simple function is a regionally affine function
. 3. For ∈ L, ζ, ζ ∈ R let D ,ζ,ζ = {( , ν, ζ ) : [ν] = ζ}. For simple functions f, g : D ,ζ,ζ → R we have that min{f, g} is either f or g. max{f, g} is either f or g.
Minimum and maximum of a finite set of regionally simple functions is regionally simple.
Let B : S → R be a regionally simple function and
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The proof is now complete.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 10
Let T(χ, µ) be a zero-player game on the subgraph where strategies of player Max (and Min) is fixed to RCPSs χ (and µ). We sketch an algorithm ComputeValueZeroPlayer(T, µ, χ) which returns the solution of optimality equations Opt (T(µ, χ) ). Observe that for T(µ, χ) the unique runs originating from statesŝ 0 = ( , ν, ζ) andŝ 0 = ( , ν , ζ) with [ν] = [ν ] follow the same "lasso" after one step, i.e. the unique runŝ
. This is so because for one-clock timed automata the successors of
and ν (c) = 0 otherwise. Consider the optimality equations for the lasso.
We show this via an induction on the distance from the region whose biases we fixed earlier to 0. 
is also simple where α i = (b α , c α , a α , ζ α ) . This follows form property 5 of Lemma 20.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 11 and Lemma 12
Proof. To prove this lemma it suffices to show that the function
is regionally constant. We already have that G is regionally constant. From the property 5 of Lemma 20 it follows thatŝ → π(ŝ, α) − G(ŝ) + B(ŝ )) is regionally simple. Note that since maximum (Property 3 of Lemma 20 of any finite set of simple functions over a region is one of the functions from the set, it follows that the set M * (·, G, B) is regionally constant. The proof for the Lemma 12 is similar and hence omitted.
C.5 Proof of Theorem 13
The following two Lemmas together with finiteness of regionally constant positional strategies give the proof of Theorem 13. The proofs of these lemma are similar to Lemma 16 and hence omitted. (G , B ) (G, B) and if χ = χ then (G , B ) > (G, B) . (G , B ) (G, B) and if µ = µ then (G , B ) < (G, B) .
Lemma 21. Let (G, B) = Opt(T(χ)). If χ = ImproveMaxStrategy(T, χ, G, B) then (G B ) = Opt(T(χ )) is such that
Lemma 22. Let (G, B) = Opt(T(χ, µ)). If µ = ImproveMinStrategy(T, µ, G, B) then (G B ) = Opt(T(χ, µ )) is such that
D Proofs from Section 5
We prove our undecidability result using a reduction from two-counter machine. A twocounter machine M is a tuple (L, C) where L = { 0 , 1 , . . . , n } is the set of instructionsincluding a distinguished terminal instruction n called HALT-and C = {c 1 , c 2 } is the set of two counters. The instructions L are one of the following types:
where l ∈ L is an instruction, and c, d are natural numbers that specify the value of counters c 1 and c 2 , respectively. The initial configuration is ( 0 , 0, 0). A run of a two-counter machine is a (finite or infinite) sequence of configurations k 0 , k 1 , . . . where k 0 is the initial configuration, and the relation between subsequent configurations is governed by transitions between respective instructions. The run is a finite sequence if and only if the last configuration is the terminal instruction n . Note that a two-counter machine has exactly one run starting from the initial configuration. The halting problem for a two-counter machine asks whether its unique run ends at the terminal instruction n . It is well known ( [20] ) that the halting problem for two-counter machines is undecidable.
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1 redrawn with location prices from {1, 0, −1}. Every location has a self loop with the guard x2, x3 = 1, reset x2, x3, which is not shown here for conciseness. The curly edge from B to C is shown below. The mean-payoff incurred in one transit from A to A via E is 14 . If M in makes no error, this is 0.
Figure 6
Simulation to increment counter C1, mean cost is ε for error ε. As seen in Figure 5 , the widgets WI 
D.1 Proofs for undecidability of mean-payoff (per-transition) games
Simulation of increment instruction.: The module to increment C 1 is given in Fig. 6 . Again, we start at k with x 1 = No time is elapsed in Check. Finally, if x 1 = 1, we can go to F , and player Min achieves his objective. However, if C 2 was non-zero, then x 1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly multiplying x 1 with 5; in this case, at some point, the edge from Check to C will be enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between C and T , will lead to a mean cost greater than 0. Consider now the case when player Min guessed that C 2 is non-zero, and hence entered the location Check c2 =0 in Fig. 7 . Let us assume now that player Max enters W taken incurring a mean cost greater than 0. If that is not the case, player Min, to prove his claim, repeatedly multiplies x 1 by 5 using the loop between B and Check. x 1 becomes 1 iff c 2 = 0. Once x 1 becomes 1, the edge from B to D will be enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between D and T , will lead to a mean cost greater than 0. Note that once x 1 becomes 1, player Min can also wait in B and transit to Check. However, due to the guard on the edge from B to Check, the delay at B will be less than 4x old , (when x 1 = 1, x 1 = x old = 2 and the mean cost will be ε. If C 2 was non-zero, then x 1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly multiplying x 1 with 5; in this case, at some point, x 1 will be greater than 1 and the edge from B to F will be enabled and player Min can achieve his objective by moving to F . Correctness of the construction. On entry into the location n (for HALT instruction), we reset clock x 1 to 0; from n , we go to a state F with price 1, with a self loop that checks x 1 = 1, and resets x 1 . 1. Assume that the two counter machine halts. If player Min simulates all the instructions correctly, he will incur a mean cost > 0, by either reaching the F after n : when player Min does not cheat, player Max has no incentive to enter any of the check widgets, he will just let the computation continue, till the Halt location is reached. This will incur a mean cost > 0. If player Min makes an error in his computation, player Max can always enter an appropriate widget, making the mean cost > 0. In summary, if the two counter machine halts, then player Min has no strategy to achieve his goal (mean pay off 0). 2. Assume that the two counter machine does not halt.
If player Min simulates all the instructions correctly, and if player Max never enters a check widget, then player Min incurs cost 0, since all locations in the main modules have price 0. Even if player Max enters some widget, the mean cost of player Min is still 0, since no errors were made by Min. However, if player Min makes an error, player Max can enter a check widget, ensuring that the mean cost is > 0. Thus, if the two counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy (by making no errors) to achieve mean cost 0. In summary, if the two counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy to achieve his goal, and vice-versa. Thus, player Min incurs a mean cost 0 iff he chooses the strategy of faithfully simulating the two counter machine, when the machine does not halt. When the machine halts, the mean cost incurred by player Min is more than 0 irrespective of whether he makes a simulation error or not.
MPG(T, r) problem, r > 0
Now we argue that the MPG(T, r) problem is undecidable for PTGAs with 3 clocks, having only binary location prices and no edge prices, for r = use binary location prices. Thus we now give here these modules with only binary prices. 
D.2 Proofs for undecidability of mean-payoff (per-time-unit) games
Mean-payoff game (per time unit) has been studied in [10] . The mean-payoff (per time unit) of a play is defined as the long-run average of cost per time unit. Formally, the mean payoff of a play Run(s, µ.χ) = σ = ( 0 , ν 0 )
−−−−→ · · · starting from a state s in which players Min and Max play according to µ and χ respectively is
We refine the undecidability result in [10] by showing the following result. Similar to the proof of Theorem 14, this proof also involves reduction from the non-halting problem of two counter machines.
Proof. We first show the undecidability of MPG(T, 0) with location prices {1, 0, −1} and no edge prices. We prove the result by reducing the non-halting problem of 2 counter machines. Given a two counter machine M, we construct a PTGA Γ with 3 clocks x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , and arbitrary location prices, but no edge prices, and show that player Min has a winning strategy iff M does not halt.
We specify a module for each instruction of the two counter machine. On entry into a module, we have x 1 = 1 5 c 1 7 c 2 , x 2 = 0 and x 3 = 0, where c 1 , c 2 are the values of counters C 1 , C 2 . We construct the PTGA Γ whose building blocks are the modules for instructions. The role of player Min is to faithfully simulate the two counter machine, by choosing appropriate delays to adjust the clocks to reflect changes in counter values. Player Max will have the opportunity to verify that player Min did not cheat while simulating the machine. We shall now present modules for increment, decrement and zero check instructions. For conciseness of the figures, we present here modules using arbitrary prices. However, we can redraw these with extra locations and edges using only the location prices from {1, 0, −1}, as was done in the case of Theorem 14. Simulation of decrement instruction. The module to simulate the decrement of counter C 1 is given in Figure 12 . We enter location k with x 1 = 1 , the cost of going once from location A to E is 5ε. Also, when we get back to A after going through the loop once, the clock values with which we entered WD 1 1 are restored; thus, each time, we come back to A, we restore the starting values with which we enter WD 1 1 . The third clock is really useful for this purpose only. The total time elapsed in 3 time units; at A, the value of clock x 3 is 0 and the transition from E to A is enabled when x 3 = 3. Hence the mean cost of transiting from A to A through E is 
−5
A 20
Figure 12
Simulation to decrement counter C1, mean cost is 5ε 3
for error ε way, it can be checked that the mean cost of transiting from A to A through E in widget WD 1 2 is 5ε 3 when player Min chooses a delay 4x old − ε at k . Thus, if player Min makes a simulation error, player Max can always choose to go to one of the widgets, and ensure that the mean pay-off is not 0. Note however that when ε = 0, then player Min will always achieve his objective: the mean pay-off will be 0.
Figure 13
Simulation to increment counter C1, mean cost is
for error ε Simulation of increment instruction.: The module to increment C 1 is given in Fig. 13 . Again, we start at k with x 1 = Figure 14 shows the module for zero-check instruction for counter C 2 . k is a no time elapse location, from where player Min chooses one of the locations Check c2=0 or Check c2 =0 . Both these are player Max locations, and player Max can either continue the simulation, or can go to the check widgets W his objective. However, if C 2 was non-zero, then x 1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly multiplying x 1 with 5; in this case, at some point, the edge from Check to C will be enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between C and T , will lead to a mean cost of 1. Consider now the case when player Min guessed that C 2 is non-zero, and hence entered the location Check c2 =0 in Fig. 14 . Let us assume now that player Max enters W If that is not the case, player Min repeatedly multiplies x 1 by 5 using the loop between B and Check. x 1 becomes 1 iff c 2 = 0. Once x 1 becomes 1, the edge from B to D will be enabled. In this case, the infinite loop between D and T , will lead to a mean cost of 1. Note that if once x 1 becomes 1, player Min could also wait in B and transit to Check. However, due to the guard on the edge from B to Check, the delay at B will be less than 4x old , where x old = 1. Say the delay is 4x old − ε in which case too player Max can go to WD 1 1 or WD 1 2 and the mean cost will be greater than 0. If C 2 was non-zero, then x 1 will never reach 1 after repeatedly multiplying x 1 with 5; in this case, at some point, x 1 will be greater than 1 and the edge from B to F will be enabled and player Min can achieve its objective by moving to F . Correctness of the construction. On entry into the location n (for HALT instruction), we reset clock x 1 to 0; from n , we go to a state F with price 1, with a self loop that checks x 1 = 1, and resets x 1 . 1. Assume that the two counter machine halts. If player Min simulates all the instructions correctly, he will incur a mean cost > 0, by either reaching the F after n : when player Min does not cheat, player Max has no incentive to enter any of the check widgets, he will just let the computation continue, till the Halt location is reached. This will incur a mean cost > 0. If player Min makes an error in his computation, player Max can always enter an appropriate widget, making the mean cost > 0. In summary, if the two counter machine halts, then player Min has no strategy to achieve his goal (mean pay off 0). 2. Assume that the two counter machine does not halt.
If player Min simulates all the instructions correctly, and if player Max never enters a check widget, then player Min incurs cost 0, since all locations in the main modules (modules simulating decrement counters, increment counters and zero check) have price 0. Even if player Max enters some widget, the mean cost of player Min is still 0, since no errors were made by Min. However, if player Min makes an error, player Max can enter a check widget, ensuring that the mean cost is > 0. Thus, if the two counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy (by making no errors) to achieve mean cost 0. In summary, if the two counter machine does not halt, player Min has a strategy to achieve his goal, and vice-versa. Thus, player Min incurs a mean cost 0 iff he chooses the strategy of faithfully simulating the two counter machine, when the machine does not halt. When the machine halts, the mean cost incurred by player Min is more than 0 irrespective of whether he makes a simulation error or not. Now we argue that the MPG(T, r) (r > 0) problem is undecidable for PTGAs with 3 clocks, having only binary location prices and no edge prices. We note that in the previous undecidability result, all the modules apart from the W D 
